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I. Introduction
Most antitrust scholars still hold dear their ban on cartels. Some have
turned agnostic on resale-price maintenance. Others grant critics their
exclusionary agreements. Most still insist, though, that horizontal
agreements to fix prices or quantities are necessarily bad. So it was that
few agreed when Lester Telser suggested that some such agreements
might sometimes be efficient. Even as other scholars began to find
empirical evidence for Telser’s game-theoretic model, few listened.1
In the article that follows, I trace the logic behind one massive but
potentially efficient series of agreements to cut production. The logic
differs from Telser’s “empty-core cycling” game, but similarly suggests
that the agreement may have generated social gains. At issue is a halfcentury’s worth of production-limitation agreements among the giant
Japanese cotton spinning firms. Although these firms structured the
agreements as a classic cartel, the logic to the agreements lay not in
monopoly pricing. Instead, it lay in the economics of “efficiency wages”
and corporate governance. If the data is specific to Japan, this logic is not.
Absent an antitrust ban, it suggests similar arrangements might appear in
many industries everywhere.
By tradition, Japan specialists accuse the cotton spinning firms of much
the same sins of which observers accused the Lancashire mills: that they
exploited their workers by paying them a pittance and exploited
consumers by fixing prices. The claims probably were not true of
Richard Epstein, Eric Feldman, Harry First, David Galenson, Michael Huberman,
William Klein, Geoffrey Miller, Yoshiro Miwa, Clark Nardinelli, Tetsuji Okazaki, Randal
Picker, Richard Posner, Frances Rosenbluth, Arthur Rosett, Richard Sander, Paul Sheard,
Richard Smethurst, Haruhito Takeda, David Weinstein, Stephen Yeazell, and participants
in a workshop at the University of Tokyo Department of Economics.
1 E.g., Lester G. Telser, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J. Law & Econ. 271
(1985); see George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at
the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J. Law & Econ. 201 (1982) (applying Telser); Stephen Craig
Pirrong, An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets, 35 J. Law &
Econ. 89 (1992) (same); Andrew R. Dick, The Competitive Consequences of Japan’s Export
Cartel Associations, 6 J. Japanese & Int’l Eco. 275 (1992) (same); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl
Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (1990)
(efficiencies to horizontal mergers). The best critique of Telser’s model appears in John
Shepard Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 556 (1987). These
models do not apply to the spinning cartel described below for the same reason that the
monopoly-rent-extracting model does not apply: the firms did not restrict capital
investments and therefore did not effectively limit production.

Lancashire. Neither were they true of Japan. The Japanese mills paid their
workers double or triple their reservation wage and charged consumers
market-clearing prices. They did agree to cut production, but not for the
reasons usually claimed. Instead, they did so to solve a two-pronged
principal-agent problem: (a) to pay wages high enough to induce their
workers to “shirk” less, and (b) to prevent their managers from cheating
on those high wages.
Like the owners of the large Lancashire mills, the Japanese mill owners
paid their workers “efficiency wages”—supra-market wages that reduced
employee shirking by more than the wage increase itself. They apparently
paid these high wages because of the unfamiliar technology they used. At
the turn of the century, they used foreign machines in a foreign factory
system. They knew neither how much to expect from their workers, nor—
given the team character to the production involved—how best to monitor
those workers. Rather than hire many managers to supervise their
workers closely, they tried to induce their employees to work hard
without much monitoring. They did so by raising the penalty workers
incurred if they lost their job, and they raised that penalty by paying
double or triple the market-clearing wage.
These efficiency wages potentially compounded the agency slack
between the mill owners and their managers. Although the managers left
some control over major decisions (like large capital investments) with the
owners, they themselves supervised the daily operations at the firm.
Necessarily, however, they could give the owners only noisy information
about the details of factory operations and only incomplete information
about the industry’s demand curve. In turn, these informational problems
created an environment where a manager sometimes jeopardized his
tenure if he reduced his plant’s production. When they did, short-term
managers had an incentive to operate the plant at full capacity even when
the reduced demand would have led the owners themselves to idle some
machines.
This situation sometimes gave managers an incentive to respond to
demand shocks by cutting wages. Because the firm intentionally paid
workers a steady premium over the workers’ shadow wage, it needed
managers who would respond to demand shocks primarily by cutting
production. If they instead merely cut wages, workers would eventually
shirk, productivity would eventually fall, and the firm’s total wage bill
would eventually rise.
Managers and investors solved this principal-agent problem through a
cartel. Through it, the firm’s managers credibly committed themselves to

responding to demand shocks by cutting production rather than wages.
By delegating decisions about production cuts to the cartel’s officers, they
tied their hands—and protected their firm’s efficiency wage regime from
themselves.
At the outset, I summarize the history of cotton spinning in Japan
(Section II). In Section III, I outline why the cartel that the spinning firms
established could not have earned them monopoly rents. I conclude by
using their efficiency wage labor contracts (Section IV.A.) to explain why
they formed the cartel that they did (Section IV.B.).
II. The Industry
A. Cotton History
Cotton had already been in Japan a millenium when entrepreneurs
began to import modern spinning machines in the mid-19th Century.2 Not
that it matters. Japanese farmers never did raise much raw cotton. In the
middle of the 19th Century they grew 49 million pounds, and by 1887 they
increased that amount to 67 million. They never grew more. Japanese
farmers had no comparative advantage in cotton production, and by 1887
spinners were already importing 10 million pounds. By the end of the
century they imported almost their entire supply, and the farmers had
switched to other crops.3
Even if Japanese farmers could not grow raw cotton competitively, in
the first decades of this century Japanese spinners and weavers came to
dominate their sectors of the industry. Half a century earlier, English firms
had led the industry. For decades, the Crown had punished anyone who
exported textile machines; by some rumors, it had even hanged them.4
Perhaps because such threats sometimes work, perhaps for more
mundane reasons, mid-19th century English firms still had some of the
best machines, and still dominated the field.
Things changed. At the turn of the century, Japanese firms adopted
this British technology. By the 1920s and 30s, they consumed more raw
2

Some of this introductory material draws on Frances McCall Rosenbluth & J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Politics of Oligarchy: Endogenizing Institutions in Imperial Japan (unpublished
MS, 1993).
3 Takeshi Abe, Men kogyo [The Cotton Industry], in Takeshi Abe and Shunsaku
Nishikawa (eds.) Sangyoka no jidai [The Age of Industrialization] 163, 170 (Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 1990); Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 13,
164, 436 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954).
4 E.J. Donnell, History of Cotton 12-13 (London: James Sutton & Co, 1872); Seki, supra
note 3, at 20.

cotton than their British competitors and spun more yarn. Domestically,
they created enormous wealth. By 1930, textile firms produced over a
quarter of all Japanese manufactured goods and employed over 40
percent of all factory workers.5
B. Cotton Crises:
During the half-century before World War II, firms in the Japanese
cotton textile industry weathered three major crises: one at the turn of the
century, one in the early 1920s, and one in the mid-1930s. Toward the end
of the 1890s, Japanese economic performance dipped badly. Where from
1886 to 1898 manufacturing volume had doubled, during the four years
from 1898 to 1902 it fell. When the Boxer Rebellion broke out and Japanese
firms could no longer sell to China, bad matters simply turned worse. In
the textile industry, output fell 11 percent from 1898 to 1900, and another 8
percent from 1900 to 1904.6
A second crisis hit the cotton firms in 1920. As it had been to many
firms in many countries, World War I was good to Japanese spinners.
During the War, many Allied competitors joined the war effort, and even
those that did not found the sea lanes precarious and the Suez Canal
closed. In East Asia, all of this dramatically raised cotton prices. From 1916
to 1919, the price of raw cotton rose 2.7 times, and that of cotton yarn 4.5
times. Given that raw cotton costs were four-fifths of the price of cotton
yarn, this price differential gave entrepreneurial spinners a nice profit.7
For exploiting these high international prices, Japanese spinners found
themselves well placed—and badly placed for the bust that followed.
From 1915 to 1919, they watched real profits per spindle more than
double. When the war ended and prices fell, they watched these profits
plummet. Granted, they did not do as badly as observers claimed. Cotton
5

Sanji Muto, Bosekigyo [The Spinning Industry], in Shakai keizai taikei [Overview of Social
Economics] 5 (no pub. infor.; cat’d in the Univ. of Tokyo Dept. Econ. lib. at 12/120P, 1927)
(cotton consumption in 1927); Seki, supra note 3, at 60 (yarn production in 1935); id. at 435
(of all manufacturing workers, 42.5% were in one of the textile industries in 1934-36).
6 Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino & Akira 0no, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [LongTerm Economic Statistics: The Textile Industry] 244-45 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha,
1979); Seisan chosa kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries] 1 (Tokyo:
Seisan chosa kai, 1912).
7 Kusuhei Mihashi (ed.), Toyo boseki kabushiki gaisha yoran [A Survey of the Toyo
Spinning Corporation] 37-38 (Osaka: Toyo boseki K.K, 1934) (price changes); Nippon
kangyo ginko chosaka (ed.) Menshi boseki gyo ni kansuru chosa [An Investigation into the
Cotton Threat Spinning Industry] 43-49 (Tokyo: Nihon kangyo ginko chosaka, 1928) (raw
cotton cost fraction; as of the late 1920s).

yarn prices did fall, but so did raw cotton prices. Nonetheless, as with the
firms elsewhere that had tried to ride the war-time boom, the spectacular
wartime profits disappeared. From 1920 to 1926, real profits per spindle
fell two-thirds (Table 1).8
The problems arose from two facts. First, not all firms had hedged
themselves against price changes. Those that had agreed to buy raw
cotton at the earlier high prices without agreeing to sell at fixed prices
now lost badly. Second, even firms that had hedged sometimes found the
protection worthless—for their partners could renege. Although those that
had contracted to sell high should have done well, they did well only if
their buyers did not default. Many buyers did. Where the price changes
had eliminated the buyer’s assets, even courts could not help.9
A third crisis hit the industry some ten years later. After the general
financial collapse of 1929-31, many governments began to adopt
protectionist policies. Some of these policies they designed explicitly
against Japanese products. Japanese firms, for example, particularly
threatened British competitors. From 1928 to 1935, Japanese cotton fabric
exports rose from 1.4 to 2.7 billion square yards, while British exports fell
from 3.9 to 1.9 billion square yards.10 To slow this competitive shift,
Commonwealth countries adopted stringent tariffs, and many added
quantity restraints to boot. By mid-1936, Japanese cotton weavers faced
trade barriers in a majority of their markets: 56 countries had adopted
barriers and over half were quotas. By one estimate, the barriers affected
67 percent of Japanese cotton fabric exports.11

Table 1: Profitability in the Cotton Spinning Industry
Profits/
Firm (¥1000)
8

Profits/
Spindle

Profits/
¥1000 Capital

William Lazonick & William Mass, The Performance of the British Cotton Industry,
1870-1913, 9 Res. Econ. Hist. 1 (1984) (performance of spinning firms in other countries);
Mihashi, supra note 7, at 37-38 (price data).
9 Seki, supra note 3, at 43-46 (buyer defaults).
10 Hiroshi Nishikawa, Nippon teikoku shugi to mengyo [Japanese Imperialism and the
Cotton Industry] 190 (Kyoto: Minerubwa shobo 1987); Seki, supra note, at 436-41. For the
debate over the cause of the British decline in cotton spinning, see Lazonick & Mass,
supra note 8
11 Fujino, Fujino & 0no, supra note 6, at 244-45; Nishikawa, supra note 10, at 192; R.
Robson, The cotton Industry in Britain 268 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1957); Seki, supra
note 3, at 55.

1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

629
307
515
203
368

17.14
6.17
8.18
3.49
5.77

354.3
136.7
181.8
79.7
139.6

1912
1913
1914
1915
1916

547
646
545
741
1431

10.29
11.77
8.61
10.81
19.91

232.9
243.7
193.9
249.2
415.4

1917
1918
1919
1920
1921

2201
2225
1730
1756
1154

30.93
27.43
26.78
25.78
16.92

543.2
443.7
330.1
228.5
150.2

1922
1923
1924
1925
1926

1213
780
956
895
862

17.18
11.15
10.99
9.31
8.44

152.5
88.8
97.2
85.1
78.5

Notes: Total capital is the sum of paid-in capital and accumulated profits.
Profits are in constant 1934–36 yen.

Table 1 cont.:

Sources: Calculated from data found in Ryokichi Watanabe, Nihon mengyo
ron [The Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 340-41 (Tokyo: Nippon
hyoron sha, 1931); Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, Nobuyuki
Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi Shinoya &
Ryoshin Minami, Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics:
Prices] 135-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha,1967).

III. The Cotton Cartel
A. Organization:
These crises were not lean years the cotton spinning firms stoically
endured for the sake of the years of plenty to come. Instead, the firms
sought safety in numbers. Already in 1882, they had organized themselves
into the “Great Japan Spinning Federation” (Dai-Nippon Boseki Rengo
Kai, abbreviated “Boren”). By all accounts, they were the first in the textile
industry to cartelize. By many accounts, they were among the first in any
modern Japanese industry to cartelize.12 To them, the Boren now became
the focus for their efforts to respond to these crises.
The conventional story is simple enough. Initially, the spinning firms
used the Boren to gain monopsonistic power in the labor market: to lower
wages by not bidding for each others’ workers.13 Soon, they used it to gain
monopolistic power in the product market: to raise profits by enforcing
quantity restraints. By 1890 they were coordinating reduced operating
hours, days, and machines (Table 2). Workers and consumers suffered, so
the story goes, but with no antitrust statute it was all legal.
Superficially, it was also plausible business strategy. If there had been
large scale economies, perhaps new firms would have found it hard to
enter the industry without access to substantial capital.14 If capital markets
were under-developed, perhaps the new firms could not have obtained
12

Toshiyuki Shinomiya, Karuteru to sono tokucho [Cartels and Their Characteristics], in
Keiichiro Nakagawa, Hidemasa Morikawa & Tsunehiko Yui (eds.), Kindai Nihon keiei shi
no kiso chishiki [Basic Information Regarding Early Modern Japanese Management History] 19394 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1990).
13 Takahiko Hashimoto, Nippon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line for the Japanese
Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] 26 (Tokyo: Bunka shi nempyo seisaku kenkyu kai, 1935).
14 In fact, there were some scale economies. See Table 9, infra.

that access except from one of the large conglomerates (the zaibatsu).15
Given the size of the globe, they arguably could not have entered the
industry quickly even with the best financial connections. Domestic firms
did not make competitive spinning machines, after all, until the late
1920s.16 Before then, a firm intent on undercutting the cartel would have
had to import its machines from Great Britain or the U.S.
During the five decades before the War, the spinning firms
coordinated capacity cuts eleven times (Table 2). They launched the first in
1890, but disbanded it within a month. They launched the last in 1930, and
continued it eight years.17 All told, they maintained capacity restraints for
twenty years. According to Table 3, moreover, production per unit of
capital equipment did decline. On average, they mandated production
cuts of about 20 percent. On average, production per spindle fell about 10
percent.
Table 2: Quantity Restraints in the
Cotton Spinning Industry, 1890-1930
Beginning
Date
Duration
1. 1890 Jun.
2. 1899 Jan.
3. 1900 May
1900 Jul.

1 mo.
1 mo.
2 mo.
3 mo.

1900 Oct.
1901 Jan.
4. 1902 Jul.
5. 1908 Jan.
1908 May

3 mo.
3 mo.
6 mo.
4 mo.
6 mo.

1908 Nov.

15

18 mo.

Restraints
No work for 8 days & nights per mo.
No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
Same
Either no night work or a 40% reduction in
machines used
Same
Same
No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
No work for 5 days & nights per mo.
Either no night work for 3 months or a 27.5%
reduction in machines used for 6 months
20% reduction in machines used

In fact, capital markets were well-developed. See Rosenbluth & Ramseyer, supra

note 2.
16

Toshiaki Chokki, Boshoku gyo to koo shita boshokki no hatten [The Development of
Spinning and Weaving Machines in Response to the Spinning and Weaving Industry], in
Nakagawa, et al., supra note 12, at 258.
17 Seki, supra note 3, at 110.

Table 2 cont.:

6. 1910 Oct.

6 mo.

1911 Apr.
1911 Oct.

6 mo.
6 mo.

1912 Apr.
7. 1914 Aug.

6 mo.
4 mo.

1914 Dec.

8 mo.

1915 Aug.

6 mo.

8. 1918 Jan.

6 mo.

1918 Jul.
9. 1920 May
1920 Jun.

6 mo.
1 mo.
2 mo.

1920 Aug.
1921 Sept.
10. 1927 May

13 mo.
3 mo.
6 mo.

1927 Nov.

20 mo.

11. 1930 Feb.

5 mo.

1930 June

5 mo.

1930 Nov.

2 mo.

Either (i) a 27.5% reduction in machines used
or (ii) no night work for 4 days & nights per
mo. plus 2 hour reduction per day plus a 12.5%
reduction in machines used
Same
Either (i) a 10% reduction in machines used or
(ii) no work for 5 days & nights per mo.
No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a
10% reduction in machines used
No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a
20% reduction in machines used
No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a
10% reduction in machines used
A 10% reduction either in the machines used
or in the days worked
Same
No work for 6 days & nights per mo.
No work for 4 days & nights per mo., a 10%
reduction in the machines used, and a
reduction of 4 hrs/day
Same, but with a 20% machine cut
Same, but 10% machine cut
No work for 4 days & nights per mo., and a
reduction of 4 hrs/day, a 15% reduction in
machines used,
No work for 4 days & nights per mo.,a 23%
reduction in machines used, and a reduction of
4 hrs/day
No work for 2 days & nights per mo.,and a
10% reduction in machines used
No work for 2 days & nights per mo., and a
20% reduction in machines used
Same

Sources: Otokichi Shoji, Boseki sogyo tanshuku shi [A History of the Spinning
Operation Reductions] (Osaka: Nippon mengyo kurabu, 1930); Seisan chosa
kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries] (Tokyo: Seisan
chosa kai, 1912); Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru karuteru

teki tosei [Cartel-Controls in the Major Industries in Our Country] 407-18
(Tokyo: Yufukan shobo, 1932).

Table 3: Quantity Restraints and Spindle Productivity

1899
1900
1901
1902
1903

Mandated
Reductions
0%
9.9
3.8
7.2
0

Bales/
Spindle
578
475
499
570
581

1916
1917
1918
1919
1920

Mandated
Reductions
1.9%
0
0
0
31.5

Bales/
Spindle
684
654
578
576
492

1904
1905
1906
1907
1908

0
0
0
0
16.8

515
657
699
663
545

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925

47.0
0
0
0
0

454
508
465
453
485

1909
1910
1911
1912
1913

20.0
12.4
19.7
9.7
0

556
566
521
626
664

1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

0
28.9
47.2
23.6
21.8

490
453
401
440
374

1914
1915

7.6
27.9

646
620

1931

25.3

358

Mean bales/spindle, when restrictions in place: 506.
Mean bales/spindle, when no restrictions in place: 559.
Mean mandated reduction when restrictions in place: 21.2%.
Mean actual reduction: 9.5%.
Notes: Mandated reductions are calculated on the basis of 20 hour work
days (2 shifts), 28 work-day months, 7 hour nights. 1916 is treated as an
unrestricted year. Bales/spindle gives the number of cotton bales
produced, divided by the number of spindles in place.

Table 3 cont.:

Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo
ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 446 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku
shuppan kai, 1954).

B. Leaks:
Nevertheless, as a long-term monopoly-pricing strategy this cartel
never had a chance. First, the Japanese cotton spinning firms faced
constant pressure from potential entrants. This simply was not an industry
with large entry barriers. The most spectacularly successful late entrant
was Nisshin boseki. Cotton merchant Hirazaemon Hibiya had launched
the firm in 1907. By 1910 it was in the second quintile of firms; by 1930 it
ranked sixth in a field of over sixty.18 Smaller firms, however, continued to
enter the industry throughout the pre-war period.
Second, the cartel never (a) incorporated all members (much less all
potential members) of the industry, or (b) limited investments in new
productive capacity.19 Consider each of these issues in turn.
1. Incomplete membership. The Boren never included all members of the
industry. Most obviously, it excluded foreign competitors, this at a time
when producers often joined cartels across national boundaries.20 The
Boren began as an organization of Japanese spinning firms, and forever
remained that. Nonetheless, those firms sold in what was always a global
market. Despite variations in thread quality, many firms in many
countries produced interchangeable thread. Granted, foreign spinners
could not necessarily compete in the domestic Japanese market. Tariffs on
imported cotton products helped ensure that. Notwithstanding, Japanese
firms did compete abroad with spinners from several countries—most
prominently, Great Britain, U.S., France, Germany, and India.
18

Nisshin boseki K.K. (ed.), Nisshin boseki 60 nen shi [A Sixty-Year History of Nisshin
boseki] (Tokyo: Nisshin boseki, K.K., 1969); Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai (ed.), Dai-Nippon
boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly Newsletter] (Osaka: DaiNippon boseki rengo kai, various issues) (relative size of firms by number of spindles).
19 In addition, note that the cartel did not take several obvious steps open to it. The
firms could have tried to restrict output through their coordinated import scheme
involving the N.Y.K. (described below), but did not. Indeed, they could have set prices,
but did not.
20 Terushi Hara & Akira Kudo, International Cartels in Business History, in Akira Kudo
& Terushi Hara (eds.) International Cartels in Business History 1, 2 (Tokyo: University of
Tokyo Press, 1992).

The spinners sold much of their product in this competitive
international market. Even when they sold to domestic weavers, those
weavers often exported the finished fabric.21 Given these international
fabric markets, Japanese spinners generally could not have charged
monopoly yarn prices to domestic weavers: as long as a downstream
product faces a competitive market, upstream cartels with fewer than all
producers (e.g., a spinning cartel that excludes foreign competitors) will
seldom be able to raise prices. Indeed, because many of the largest
Japanese spinners (like the large American spinners) ran integrated
spinning and weaving operations, many Boren members sold fabric on the
international market directly (Table 4).22
Until 1936, the Boren could not even convince all Japanese spinners to
join.23 To be sure, it tried to make membership worthwhile. It never made
it indispensable. In 1893 it negotiated a favorable shipping contract with
the N.Y.K., the Mitsubishi shipping firm.24 Under this agreement, the
N.Y.K. agreed to pay large rebates to association members who used it for
their raw cotton. More specifically, the N.Y.K. charged shippers full price,
but at the end of the accounting season rebated to Boren members a large
portion of that price.
Unfortunately for the Boren, the bulk shipping market was a
competitive market. As one scholar recently put it, “collusion among
shippers has never survived” in this industry.25 The Japanese shipping
firms launched periodic price wars with the western firms, and were not
always the low bidder. Yet the Boren could have made membership
21

Mihashi, supra note 7, at 7 (foreign competitors); 0kura sho zeikanbu (ed.),
Kanzeiritsu enkaku [A History of Tariff Rates] Tokyo: 0kura sho, 1968) (tariffs).
22 Although these integrated firms operated fewer than 20 percent of all looms, they
operated the most efficient ones. In 1936, they ran nearly three-fourths of the 46,000
automatic looms in use. With a fifth of the looms, they wove a third of the fabric. See
Table 4; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka (ed.), Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] 413
(Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai, 1936) (automatic loom use). On integrated spinning and
weaving operations in the West, see John S. Lyons, Vertical Integration in the British Cotton
Industry, 1825-1850: A Revision, 45 J. Econ. Hist. 419 (1985); Peter Temin, Product Quality
and Vertical Integration in the Early Cotton Textile Industry, 48 J. Econ. Hist. 891 (1988).
23 As of September 1927, for instance, 11 spinning companies representing 6 percent
of all cotton spindles were outside the Boren. Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, at 55-58. The
remaining 11 firms joined the Boren in May 1936. Zaisei keizai jiho sha (ed.), Nippon sen’i
kogyo soran okutsuki [An Overview of the Japanese Textile Industry, with Appendix] 210
(Tokyo: Zaisei keizai jiho sha, 1936).
24 Reprinted in Seisan chosa kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries]
26-29 (Tokyo: Seisan chosa kai, 1912). Other shipping firms later joined the N.Y.K.
25 Pirrong, supra note 1, at 128.

advantageous only (i) if the N.Y.K. charged prices below international
competitive prices, and (ii) if no other international shipping firm were
willing to match those prices.26
Renegade spinners simply did not need the N.Y.K. Although the Boren
firms could together obtain bulk discounts, so could most other spinners.
Major spinning firms would have qualified for equivalent discounts
elsewhere. Whatever clout the Boren had, as the shipping arm of the
Mitsubishi empire the N.Y.K. was not the sort of firm on which it likely
could have imposed monopsonistic prices. Unless it was indeed extracting
monopsonistic rents, though, renegade firms could have competed
without joining it.27
2. Investment limits. As Table 3 details, the Boren never tried to limit the
total number of spindles. Instead, it mandated cuts only in either operating
hours or the percentage of spindles used. This made for a bizarre cartel,
for to earn its members monopoly rents the Boren had to cut the quantity
produced. To do that, it could not just cut hours or furlough existing
spindles. It needed also to limit the purchase of new spindles. That it
26

Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru karuteru teki tosei [Cartel-Controls in
the Major Industries in Our Country] 478-511 (Tokyo: Yufukan shobo, 1932) (shipping
cartels); Nihon keiei shi kenkyu sho (ed.), Nippon yusen kabushiki kaisha 100-nen shi [A 100Year History of the N.Y.K.] 7-74, 123-29 (Tokyo: Nippon yusen kabushiki kaisha, 1988)
(competition between N.Y.K. and the western firms); William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the
N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Busines Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry 289-308, 400-08
(Cambridge: Harv. Council E. Asian Stud. Pub., 1984) (same); William D. Wray, Kagami
Kenkichi and the N.Y.K., 1929-1935: Vertical Control, Horizontal Strategy, and Company
Autonomy, in William D. Wray (ed.), Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from the Prewar
Experience 182, 187 (Cambridge: Harv. Council E. Asian Stud. Pub.) (existence of irregular
“tramp shipping”).
Indeed, if the Boren had been a pricefixing scheme and if the N.Y.K. had had a lock
on cotton imports, one would expect the Boren to have enforced its quantity restraints
through its control over raw cotton imports. Given that the spinners depended critically
on cotton imports, that bottleneck offered the perfect monitoring device. The Boren did
not do so—both because it was not a pricefixing scheme (discussed infra), and because the
N.Y.K. did not have a lock on the import trade.
27 In addition, note two points. First, the Boren convinced the domestic raw cotton
producers not to sell to non-Boren firms. Because domstic producers raised a small
fraction of the cotton consumed, this was not a major barrier. Second, in 1930 the Boren
convinced the cotton yarn sellers’ association not to buy yarn from non-Boren firms. In
return, Boren members agreed to sell only to members of the sellers’ association. See
Kojima, supra note 26, at 413; Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, at 54-55; Seki, supra note 3, at
114-16. At this point, the only firms safely able to remain outside the Boren would have
been those that both spun and wove. As Table 4 shows, however, the biggest Japanese
firms operated integrated spinning and weaving factories.

never did. In letting firms buy new spindles but not letting them use them
fully, it apparently ensured only that its members invested inefficiently.
Even as the Boren mandated production cuts, spinning firms
continued to buy new equipment (Table 5). Despite the capacity restraints,
they aggressively built new factories and installed new spindles. Indeed,
they built more factories and installed more spindles while the restraints
were in place than while they were not. Were this a production-restriction
cartel, it was one that failed.

Table 4: Spinning Firms in the Weaving Industry
A
Total
Looms
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935

B
Spinning
Looms
6,077
17,002
27,931
43,725
365,369
61,918
348,903
69,147
385,980
83,308

D
C=
Total
B/A
Fabric
% 715
1222
1824
6936
16.9 7719
19.8 4933
21.6 8104

E
Spinning
Fabric
154
332
710
2950
2732
1631
2466

G
E/Firm
Rev.
11.9%
18.5

F=
E/D
21.5%
27.2
38.9 27.3
42.5 27.0
35.4 22.5
33.1 25.5
30.4
21.7

Notes:
(A) Total number of cotton weaving looms in use.
(B) Total number of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms.
(C) Percentage of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms.
(D) Value in current prices (x ¥100,000) of total cotton fabric produced.
(E) Value in current prices (x ¥100,000) of cotton fabric produced by
spinning firms.
(F) Percentage of total cotton fabric produced by spinning firms.
(G) Percentage of spinning firm revenues attributable to weaving
operations.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino &
Akira Ono, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [Long-Term Economic Statistics:
Textile Industry] 74-83, 242-43 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979);
Miyohei Shinohara, Choki keizai tokei: kokogyo [Long-term Economic Statistics:
Mining and Manufacturing] 194-95 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1972);
Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka (ed.), Shoko sho tokei hyo [Statistical Tables for

the Ministry of Commerce and Industry] (Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai, various
years).
Table 5: Spinning Cartel Cheating

1920
1921
1922
1923

A.
Mandated
Reductions
31.5%
47.0
0
0

B.
Spinning
Factories
(40)
89
(159)
(1)

C.
Spindles
(x 1000_)
355
299
394
284

1924
1925
1926
1927

0
0
0
28.9

20
(8)
37
(22)

(91)
451
293
263

1928
1929
1930
1931

47.2
23.6
21.8
25.3

6
38
18
15

531
233
595
221

Mean new spindles while restrictions in place: 328,000.
Mean new spindles while no restrictions in place: 266,000.
Mean new spinning fact’s while restrictions in place: 14.8.
Mean new spinning fact’s while no restrictions in place: -22.2.
Notes:
(A) Cartel-mandated reductions.
(B) Net increase (or decrease) in number of spinning factories with five or
more employees.
(C) Net increase (or decrease) in number of operating spindles.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei
ka (ed.), Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] (Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai,
various years); Tsusho sangyo daijin kanbo chosa tokei kyoku (ed.), Kogyo
tokei 50 nenshi [A Fifty Year History of the Manufactures Census] (Tokyo:
0kura sho insatsu kyoku, 1961); Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of

the Japanese Cotton Industry] 446 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai,
1954).

C. Temporary Local Gains?
Even if the Boren firms could not have earned monopoly rents longterm, perhaps they hoped to exploit a temporary local monopoly.28
Expansion in the industry did take time. Because most firms already
operated 25 to 28 days a month, 20 to 22 hours a day, non-Boren firms
could not have dramatically expanded production without buying new
machines. Yet until the 1920s, almost all machines came from either Great
Britain or the United States. Even with a telegraphed order, expansion
would have taken quite a while. Meanwhile, perhaps the Boren firms
could have earned monopoly returns.29
28

Many Japanese historians (e.g., Nishikawa, supra note 10, at 154; 2 Naosuke
Takamura, Nihon boseki gyo shi josetsu [An Introduction to the History of the Japanese Spinning
Industry] 178-91 (Tokyo: Hanawa shobo, 1971)) suggest a very different explanation for
the cartel: that the largest spinning firms used the restrictions to gain a competitive
advantage over the smaller firms. Recall, however, that membership in the cartel was
voluntary, that spinning firms imported raw cotton in a competitive international market,
and that they sold yarn and fabric on a competitive international market. As a result, this
explanation necessarily fails. The large spinning firms could have induced the small
firms to join the Boren (or to remain in the Boren) and suffer the exploitative
consequences only if the small firms earned a net gain by doing so. Hence the large firms
would have had to compensate the smaller firms for any exploitation the small firms
summered. Because of the competitive market constraints, however, the large Boren
firms had no way of using the Boren to generate sufficient monopoly rents to pay that
compensation and still earn a profit.
Tetsuji Okazaki, 1930-nen dai no Nihon ni okeru keiki junkan [Japanese Business Cycles
and Capital Accumulation in the 1930s], 39-2 Shakai kagaku kenkyu 1 (1987), suggests a
ingenious alternative: Small spinners were heavily invested in low-count thread, and
large spinners were invested in high-count thread. Small spinners wanted to move into
high-count thread and used the cartel to give them breathing space to do that. Aside from
whether the cartel would have given any breathing space without international market
power, and aside from whether large firms would ever have agreed to such a plan,
Okazaki’s theory does not explain why small firms would find advantageous a scheme
that disabled themselves as much as it disabled their competitors.
29 On the hours and days worked, see the tables at the end of any issue of DaiNippon, supra note 18; on the source of spinning machines, see Mariko Tatsuki, Mitsui
Bussan no setsuritsu to hatten [The Establishment and Development of Mitsui Bussan], in
Nakagawa, et al., supra note 12, at 36, 40.

As an explanation for the Boren, none of this could have worked—
short-term monopoly returns cannot explain the measures the Boren took.
Most basically, the measures were not short-term. Rather, they lasted for
months and years. Nor did the Boren ignore the measures once
competition eroded any monopoly price. Instead, month after month,
Boren firms regrouped to change the percentage of spindles furloughed,
the number of days closed, or the number of hours per day worked. To
the firms themselves, the cuts meant more than any short-term advantage.
Second, (as noted earlier) the Boren firms never tried to limit total
production. Absent such an agreement, they could not have raised prices.
As Tables 2 and 3 show, although they required each other to reduce the
percentage of their equipment that they operated, they let each other
freely expand that equipment. Had they wanted to affect prices, they
would not have agreed just to cut the stock used. They would also have
agreed to idle any new equipment they bought. Because they did not do
so, the Boren firms could not have successfully raised prices, even
temporarily. According to Gary Saxonhouse, the American economist
who has spent the most time on the industry, they did not: Boren firms
did not “restrict industry output, even on a cyclical basis.”30
IV. Cotton Logic
The basic puzzle thus remains: if the Boren firms were not trying to
earn monopoly rents, what did they think they were doing? The answer, I
suggest, is that they were trying to solve two principal-agent problems at
once: to pay workers enough to reduce their “shirking,” and to enable
their managers to commit credibly to keeping wages at levels that would
mitigate that shirking.31 Turn first to the wages in the industry (Section
IV.A.), then to the managerial problems (Section IV.B.).
30

Gary Saxonhouse, Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry, in Hugh Patrick and Larry Meisner (eds.), Japanese
Industrialization and its Social Consequences 97, 122 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976); Gary Saxonhouse, Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in Japanese Economic
History, 12 Managerial & Dec. Econ. ___ (1991). Note that this is consistent with the 9.5%
fall in productivity during the cartel (Table 3). The cartels were in place during slack
demand. Even if they had been completely ineffective, production would have fallen
somewhat during their tenure—if only because consumers were less willing to buy the
yarn.
31 Readers may also ask why the Boren (like many trade associations) did not try to
manipulate the political process to form a legally enforceable cartel. The reason,
elaborated on in Rosenbluth & Ramseyer, supra note 2, is that the zaibatsu firms had the
greatest political influence in pre-war Japan, and the zaibatsu firms had interests contrary

A. Efficiency Wages:
1. Monitoring and shirking. Picture the problem that the owners of the
new mills faced. In a society where almost all manufacturing occurred in
small shops, they built massive factories. In a world where machines ran
on muscle or water, they introduced steam and later electricity. In the new
factories, they installed large, complicated, and expensive British-made
machines.
To run these powerful new factories and machines, the owners needed
managers and workers they did not have. They needed managers who
could organize individual workers into teams suited to factory
production. They needed managers who could structure incentives so that
the workers individually would not free-ride on each other. They needed
managers who could teach people to run the new machines and to avoid
breaking them. As of 1891, however, they had only one formally trained
engineer for every six factories.32
The owners also needed workers who would work obediently,
regularly, and carefully. As the new ring spindles were relatively easy to
operate, they did not need workers who understood much physics or
chemistry, or workers with much physical strength. They did need
workers who would not ignore instructions, who would not skip work on
a whim, and who would not take breaks that disrupted production at the
entire plant. They needed, in short, workers with what we now call “basic
work habits.” Before the industrial revolution, few people considered such
habits basic, for few people needed them in either agrarian or handicraft
production. Eventually, school teachers did bring these habits to Japanese
peasant children. As of 1891, though, only a quarter of the workers at the
spinning plants had attended primary school.33
Somehow, the mill owners had to teach their workers to use the new
machines safely and effectively, to convince them to work together as a
team, and to induce them not to free-ride on each other. Fundamentally,
to the Boren. The zaibatsu were not heavily invested in cotton spinning (Table 10). Yet the
Mitsubishi (through the N.Y.K.) shipped the bulk of the raw cotton to the spinners, while
the Mitsui marketed the finished product abroad. Any contraction in the raw cotton
consumed or the cotton yarn sold (even if international competitive market forces would
have allowed this) would thus have directly harmed the politically powerful Mitsubishi
and Mitsui.
32 Saxonhouse, Country, supra note 30, at 109; see Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika
(ed.) Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial Statistics] 63 (Tokyo: Noshomu sho
somukyoku tokeika, 1903) (many factory supervisors did not understand the machines
under their jurisdiction).
33 Saxonhouse, Country, supra note 30, at 109.

this was largely a matter of incentives. Unfortunately, to use the optimal
incentives the owners had to be able to monitor workers individually and
to dispense appropriate penalties and rewards. Yet precisely because it
involves joint production, team work is hard to meter. Precisely because
cotton spinning involved team work, the owners found it hard to meter
their workers—and hard, therefore, to reward and discipline them
appropriately.
This is complicated enough where the technology is familiar; it is
harder still where everything about the factory is strange.34 With new
machines, an owner often will have no idea how much he (the owners and
managers of these factories were generally men) can expect of a recruit.
Not knowing what to expect, he cannot set the proper piece rate.
Predictably, many of the earliest Japanese factory owners produced
nothing so much as chaos. Their workers did not know how to use the
machines, their managers did not know how to structure incentives to
motivate workers, and absent appropriate incentives the workers had
little reason to learn to use the machines.
Contemporary observers chronicled the chaos. “If a supervisor can see
the employees (particularly day laborers), they work attentively,”
reported one otherwise sympathetic man in 1899. “But as soon as he
disappears, they gossip in groups of two or three.”35 “The day after
payday,” another observer wrote, “employees regularly skip work.”36
According to the oral histories of the workers themselves, they even slept
on the job.37
2. Market-clearing wages. Workers shirked in these early factories for a
simple reason: they preferred leisure to work and had no reason not to
indulge that preference. Through their work, they earned the going rate—
a wage that cleared the labor market. But when labor markets clear,
34

Given (a) the asymmetric distribution of information between workers and
management regarding worker abilities, and (b) the inability of management to commit
credibly to a given wage structure, piece rate contracts never entirely solve the incentive
problem. See Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy ch. 5
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13
Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982).
35 Gennosuke Yokoyama, Nihon no kaso shakai [Japanese Lower-Class Society] 179
(Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1899) (cotton spinning workers).
36 Noshomu sho, Shokko jijo [Circumstances of Factory Workers] 235 (1903; reprinted,
Tokyo: Koseikan, 1981) (steel workers).
37 Shigemi Yamamoto, Aa nomugi toge: aru seishi kojo aishi [Ah, the Nomugi Pass: A
Tragic History of the Factory Women in the Silk Thread Industry] 180 (Tokyo: Kadogawa
shoten, 1977).

workers who quit a job can easily find another. And if all firms pay the
market-clearing wage, a worker will earn the same wage in her (most
textile workers were women) new job as she earned in the old. Workers
can safely work when they want, rest when they want. In agricultural and
handicraft industries, such work habits seldom disrupt. In a modern
factory, they wreak havoc.
If the spinning mills could have monitored their workers cheaply, they
could have mitigated this problem. If their managers might have noticed
and fired them when they shirked, workers would have shirked less
profligately. Yet monitoring is not free, of course, and hence the problem.
The more monitoring costs, the more cheaply workers can indulge their
preference for leisure over work. If losing their job costs them little (if they
earn market-clearing wages) and if monitoring is often ineffective (if they
can often shirk unnoticed), rational workers may choose to shirk as they
please.
3. Efficiency wages. All this generates the well-known paradox of
“efficiency wages”: the more monitoring costs, the more likely employers
can lower labor costs by raising wages.38 If workers shirk because they can
easily earn equivalent wages elsewhere, a firm can sometimes save money
by paying them more. For when it does so, workers who lose their job lose
income. Rather than lose their well-paying job (a risk they retain if the
firm maintains even moderate levels of monitoring), they may now decide
to reduce their shirking. Even if all equivalent firms pay the same high
wages, workers who lose their job still lose—for wages above marketclearing levels necessarily generate unemployment. Given the higher
unemployment levels, fired workers now spend longer finding their next
job.
The classic example is Ford. In 1914, Henry Ford paid his workers
$2.34 per day. The wage was the going rate and cleared the market.
Because everyone else paid it as well, jobs were easy to find. Workers,
observers recalled, could quit Ford in the morning and find another job by
noon. As a result, Ford found himself with an annual turnover rate of 370
percent, and chaos in his assembly line. To solve this problem, he doubled
wages. At $5 a day, workers now stood in line for a Ford job. At $5 a day,
38

See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information 166-67 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989);
Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
74 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1984); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the
Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1987); see also Eric Rasmusen, “An IncomeSatiation Model of Efficiency Wages,” 80 Econ. Inquiry 467, 475 (1992) (model applicable
to low-wage workers).

Ford himself boasted, “I have a thousand men who if I say ‘Be at the
northeast corner of the building at four a.m.,’ will be there at four a.m.”39
The large Lancashire cotton spinning mills in the 19th century similarly
paid efficiency wages.40 Because they regularly experimented with new
technology, they regularly found it hard to monitor their employees. “In
the heyday of industrialization, managerial methods of supervising
workers and monitoring how much they could produce were
unsophisticated,” explains economic historian Michael Huberman. Even
though the larger Lancashire firms tried to mitigate these problems with
piece-rate wages, they still “had difficulty in linking effort to output and
setting piece rates.” Accordingly, they chose not to rely exclusively on
monitoring. Instead, they “paid efficiency wages to reduce the loss of
productivity associated with shirking.”41
4. The Japanese mills. Turn-of-the-century Japanese cotton-spinning
firms too paid efficiency wages. The giant Kanebo firm did so most
extravagantly, advertising not just its wages but also the various other
amenities it offered. Modern scholars often doubt whether it improved
employee welfare as much as it claimed, but in doubting they miss the
point. Kanebo did not adopt its scheme out of charity. Instead, it adopted
it as a simple profit-maximizing efficiency wage strategy. Its wage
premium was stark. Table 6 details (i) the mean daily wage paid by all
Boren firms to their female workers as of the middle of each year, (ii) the
comparable figure for Kanebo, and (iii) the resulting premium attributable
to Kanebo employment. In the late 19th century, Kanebo paid close to a
third more than its competitors. Although Kanebo’s wage dominance
faded, it faded only because other firms soon hiked their wages as well. As
Table 7 shows, the larger firms did adopt efficiency wages before the
smaller firms did; but as Table 8 shows, by 1910 the industry as a whole
paid textile workers double what they could earn on the farm.
The Japanese story does not parallel early-19th century Lancashire
completely. Where only the larger Lancashire firms paid high wages, by
39

Miller, supra note 34, 65-71.
Michael Huberman, Invisible Handshakes in Lancashire: Cotton Spinning in the First
Half of the Nineteenth Century, 46 J. Econ. Hist. 987 (1986); Michael Huberman, How Did
Labor Markets Work in Lancashire? More Evidence on Prices and Quantities in Cotton Spinning,
1822-1852, 28 Explorations Econ. Hist. 87 (1991); Michael Huberman, Industrial Relations
and the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from M’Connel and Kennedy, 1810-1840, 65 Bus. Hist.
Rev. 345 (1991).
41 Huberman, How, supra note 40, at 88.
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1915 large and small Japanese firms alike paid similar rates (Table 7).42
Because large and small firms used the same technology in Japan, similar
wages and hours are exactly what one would expect. By the turn of the
century, almost all Japanese mills used standard steam-powered Platt
Brothers machines.43 Whatever monitoring problems large firms
experienced, small firms faced them too. After large firms found it
advantageous to pay high wages, small firms soon followed suit.

Table 6: The Kanebo Wage Premium

1898
1908
1919

Boren
mean
¥14.99
24.89
80.51

Kanebo
mean
¥19.60
29.00
84.10

Kanebo
premium
30.8%
16.5
4.5

Source: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai
(ed.), Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation
Monthly Newsletter] (Osaka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years)
(1918 data unavailable).

Table 7: Mean Hours and Wages in
the Spinning Industry, by Firm Size
A. Daily Hours
Quintile
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
42

1900
19.4
19.0
18.8
16.9
18.1

1905
22.7
21.7
23.3
22.8
22.4

1910
22.9
22.3
20.6
22.6
21.4

1915
22.3
21.9
23.0
23.1
22.8

1921 1925
19.8 19.7
19.0 21.1
20.1 19.6
20.1 19.9
19.5 20.2

A point confirmed by separate calculations in Konosuke Odaka, Niju kozo [Dual
Structure] in Takafusa Nakamura and Konosuke Odaka (eds.), Niju kozo [Dual Structure]
133, 161 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989).
43 Tatsuki, supra note 29, at 37; Saxonhouse, Mechanisms, supra note 30.

Table 7 cont.:

B. Daily Wages
Quintile 1900
First
¥0.193
Second
0.195
Third
0.175
Fourth
0.164
Fifth
0.153

1905
¥0.239
0.224
0.217
0.190
0.192

Mandated cuts: 9.9% 0.0

1910 1915
1921
1925_
¥0.298 ¥0.319 ¥1.109 ¥1.323
0.268 0.302 1.073 1.096
0.284 0.310 1.201 1.222
0.246
0.344
1.079 1.225
0.236
0.305
1.060 1.260
12.4

27.9

31.5

0.0

Notes: The firms are divided into quintiles on the basis of the number of
spindles in each firm. Wages are daily wages for female workers in
current yen. The data are for the months of July for each year except when
July was unavailable (when nearest available month was used instead).
Mandated production cuts are taken from Table 3. Hours are number of
hours of operation of factories operated by firm. 1921 is substituted for
1920 because of the unavailability of 1920 data.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai (ed.),
Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly
Newsletter] (Osaka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years).

5. The quantity of labor. Given their efficiency wage strategy, Japanese
spinners could not resond to demand shocks by cutting wages. Instead,
they had to cut the quantity of labor they hired. Recall that they paid a
premium in order to induce employees not to shirk. If they now cut that
premium, they increased shirking. In the long run, they thereby raised
their total labor costs.
Because most textile workers came from (and returned to) rural
villages, the shadow wage that determined whether they found shirking
advantageous depended on the difference between their spinning wage
and their agricultural wage. During much of the pre-war period, about 80
percent of the cotton-spinning workers were women, and about 60 percent
of these women came from the farm.44 In terms of efficiency wage, the
44

Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku (ed.), Boseki rodo fujin chosa [An Investigation into
Women Working in the Spinning Industry] 5 (Tokyo: Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku,

crucial premium for them was the premium they received over the
agricultural wage. If the demand for cotton yarn fell, spinning firms paying
efficiency wages could safely cut wages only if agricultural wages also fell.
In fact, they often did not. Hence, if a spinning firm sought to pay double
or triple the agricultural wage, it could not respond to demand shocks by
lowering wages. It could only lower production.45 Japanese firms did just
that—when demand fell, they cut the quantity of labor they hired (Table
8).
Note a complication: if spinning firms cut output by firing workers,
they potentially vitiated their efficiency wage scheme, for workers would
discount their higher wages by their higher probability of being fired.
Rather than lay off existing workers, therefore, Japanese spinning firms
cut production by delaying new hires. In most years, 1/4 to 1/3 of their
workers quit voluntarily anyway. They quit because they had never
planned to work a long time. They had come to the factory to work a few
years and save. Having done exactly as they planned, they returned to
their farm to marry. Because so many women quit each year, the spinning
firms could adjust to demand shocks simply by deferring new hires.46
6. The price of labor. Few facts about the spinning firms are more
prominent than the high wages they paid their workers (Table 8). Most of
these workers were young women off the farm with few marketable
abilities other than agricultural skills. By 1910, the cotton spinning firms
paid them double the agricultural wage. They continued to pay at least
double for most of the next three decades.47
1929); Takejiro Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko tokei [Reference Statistics Regarding Labor in the
Cotton Industry] 365 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1958).
45 That cutting production would generally lower per-unit production costs is
straightforward: on a short-term basis, cutting production quantity lowers marginal (and
short-term average variable) production costs because the marginal cost curve cuts
average cost curves from below, and because the short-term average variable cost curve
lies below the average total cost curve. In a long-term equilibrium, of course, firms will
sell at a price equal to long-term total average costs.
46 Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu (ed.), Keihin kogyo chitai o chushin to suru chingin chosa
hokoku [Survey Report on Wages Paid Primarily in the Keihin Industrial Area] 187-91 (Tokyo:
Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu, 1936); Riyuemon Uno, Shokko kinzoku nen su cho (jo) [A
Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (I)] 14 (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1915)
(Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A163); Riyuemon Uno, Shokko kinzoku nen su cho (ge) [A
Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (II)] 12 (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1915)
(Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A164).
47 Shindo, supra note 44, at 396, finds similar ratios for the early post-War years. I use
mean annual wage rates for female agricultural workers rather than mean daily wage rates
(as, e.g., 1 Takamura, supra note 28, at 302, does) for two reasons. First, agricultural work

Other data indirectly confirm these high wages. Take one 1927 survey
of 3,966 workers at 12 cotton spinning factories. These women sent home
each month mean amounts ranging from 5.2 percent of their wages at one
factory to 60.5 percent at another. Unfortunately, the report does not give
the number of respondents within each plant. Averaging the 12 factory
means, however, gives a mean of 36.0 percent. In addition, these women
every month saved another 7.0 to 52.1 percent of their pay. Averaging the
factory means gives 24.3 percent. All told, the women saved or sent home
an average of 59.9 percent of their wages: amounts ranging from a mean
of 43.2 percent at the lowest factory to 67.5 percent at the highest.48
7. Historians and textile workers. Despite this evidence, sophisticated
social historians continue vociferously to lament the plight of the spinning
mill workers. Gail Lee Bernstein, for example, describes the lives that the
silk-reeling workers (a job with some technical differences from cotton
spinning) lived as “deplorable.” Workers sang, she adds, songs with titles
like the “Song of the Living Corpses.”49 Patricia Tsurumi describes the
spinning mill dormitories as “prisons,” the wash rooms as “appalling,”
was highly seasonal where textile work was steadier. Thus, daily textile and agricultural
rates do not give an accurate picture of the relative expected earnings of women in the
two sectors. Second, spinning firms generally provided room (or at least provided
heavily subsidized room) in addition to wages; yearly agricultural contracts probably did
as well, though daily work did not. Note that most spinning firms did charge for board.
According to one 1927 survey of 12 cotton spinning factories, the women paid the factory
a mean food charge ranging from 10.8 percent of salary at one factory to 22.8 percent at
another. The mean of the 12 factory means was 16.9 percent. Chuo, supra note 44, at 6970; see Hosei, supra note 46, at 168. According to Riyuemon Uno, Shoku hi teigaku no chosa
[A Survey of Food Charges] (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1917) (Shokko mondai shiryo, No.
B79), factories charged an average of 9.31 sen/day for board, and subsidized these meals
with another 4.57 sen/day.
48 Chuo, supra note 44, at 69-70; Hosoi, supra note 46, at 140, 184 (corroborating data).
Firms sometimes offered the woman (or her family) a sign-on loan of part of her future
earnings. Unlike the cash advances in the sex industry (see J. Mark Ramseyer, Indentured
Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry, 7 J. Law,
Econ. & Org. 89 (1991)) these loans were relatively small. Of a sample of 8,926 workers
hired by large Tokyo-area spinning factories in 1926, workers (or their families) received
a mean sign-on loan of only ¥22.23—about 16 days’ wages. See Chuo, supra note 44, at 33;
corroborarted by data in Hosoi, supra note 46, at 99, 140.
49 Gail Lee Bernstein, Women in the Silk-reeling Industry in Nineteenth-century Japan, in
Gail Lee Bernstein & Haruhiro Fukui (eds.), Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History
and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi 63 (London: Macmillan Press, 1988). She rightly
notes that the women “may have been better off” than they had been at home. Id., at 67.
An English translation of the song appears at E. Patricia Tsurumi, Factory Girls: Women in
the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan 157-59 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

and the food as “shoddy” and inadequate. Winter days in the factories
were cold, and “the hot humid days of summer were hell.”50 Andrew
Gordon assigns textile workers “the worst objective situation of any group
of workers.”51 And Mikiso Hane concludes that “what frequently came to
prevail was unrestrained exploitation.”52
Perhaps the historians rely too heavily on the the documents bourgeois
journalists and social reformers left, for the women themselves told a
radically different story.53 Consider oral historian Shigemi Yamamoto’s
experience. Yamamoto interviewed 580 former textile workers for what he
planned as their “tragic history.” To his surprise, none of the women
regretted having taken her factory job, none complained of the food she
ate in the factory dormitories, none thought she had been underpaid, and
only three percent of the women thought their work had been harsh. By
contrast, 90 percent thought the food had been good, 70 percent thought
their pay had been high, and most found the work “more fun than the
work at home.”54
“At least I got to eat rice,” one former textile worker told Yamamoto.
“It was better than staying home.” And whether many sang Bernstein’s
“Song of the Living Corpses,” Yamamoto’s interviewees remembered
some very different songs:55
Shall I fall in love with the boss,
or shall I ignore the boss?
Think about it,
and before you know it you’ve finished the thread.
Rather than fall for the boss and be hated,
50Tsurumi,

supra note 49, at 132-35, 141. Elsewhere, she properly notes that the wages
were higher than other employment opportunities for women, and that the “poorly
prepared and spoiled food” that the women supposedly received “would have seemed a
splendid feast” to starving peasants. Id., at 132-35, 141, 148-49, 162.
51 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan 75 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
52 Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey 144 (Boulder: Westview Press,
1986). See also Barbara Malony, Activism Among Women in the Taisho Coitton Textile
Industry, in Gail Lee Bernstein (ed.), Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 217, at 232
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) (“Girls’ salaries were extremely low.”).
53 A mistake scholars of Japanese history have made elsewhere as well, whether
when they write about women specifically, see Ramseyer, supra note 48, or when they
write about peasants generally, see Richard J. Smethurst, Agricultural Development and
Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
54 Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 332.
55 Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 50, 72 (translation by M. Ramseyer).

I think I’ll head for the sunshine,
I think I’ll head for the young ones.
I may have left home saying I’d reel thread,
but now I’m reeling in guys instead.
8. Other evidence of efficiency wages. Even if workers earned high wages,
they need not have earned “efficiency wages.” Instead, perhaps they just
earned wages that compensated them for unusual disamenities. Several
aspects of the record, however, suggest that the cotton spinning workers
did earn efficiency rather than market-clearing wages. First, the workers
recalled their jobs fondly. Had they earned market-clearing wages for
harsh work, few would have remembered their factory years with the
affection that Yamamoto found.
Second, the workers earned a premium over their shadow agricultural
wage that held relatively steady (Table 8). Because the demands for
agricultural and textile products moved independently, market-clearing
wages in the two industries would not have moved in tandem.
Notwithstanding, in Japan the ratio of textile to agricultural wages did
hold fairly constant: textile workers earned double or triple the
agricultural wage. Even when their employers’ profits fell, their wage
tended to hold firm. It moved independently of textile firm profits but in
tandem with agricultural wages, and it did so precisely because it was an
efficiency wage56—because the employers found it important to give their
workers a large incentive not to shirk.
Third, the textile firms offered labor contracts that in other ways
corroborated how hard they tried to create incentives for their employees
not to shirk. Most dramatically, many firms withheld part of their
workers’ wages as performance bonds. As it had been for many
indentured servants in the Americas,57 part of a textile worker’s pay was
contingent on her satisfactorily completing her contract.58 If she shirked,
the firm fired her and kept the bond; if she worked well and completed
her contract, it paid her the bond when she quit. As one might expect,
56

Fujino, Fujino & 0no, supra note 6, at 22.
Stanley L. Engerman, Servants to Slaves to Servants: Contract Labour and European
Expansion, in P.C. Emer (ed.), Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After
Slavery 263, 268-69 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986)
58 See Chuo, supra note 44, at 67-68 (1929); Nobuhiko Murakami, Meiji josei shi [A
History of Meiji Women] 135 (Tokyo: Riron sha, 1971).
57

workers hated these contractual provisions.59 Only firms that found it
usually hard to monitor their workers would have demanded contracts
that placed them in as disadvantageous a position as did these.

Table 8: The Price and Quantity of Labor
in Cotton Spinning

1890
1892
1894
1896
1898

A.
Daily
(current ¥)
.08
.09
.10
.12
.16

1900.
1902
1904
1906
1908

.19
.22
.22
.25
.27

3.96
4.10
4.07
4.02
4.13

1.61
1.71
1.75
1.84
1.90

15,236
16,933
13,952
20,153
17,999

1910
1912
1914
1916
1918

.29
.32
.33
.33
.47

4.68
4.38
4.79
4.74
4.10

2.14
1.65
2.21
2.08
1.57

23,263
25,200
29,271
32,616
29,415
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B.
Hourly
(constant sen)
2.22
2.71
2.95
2.85
3.27

C.
Spin/
agri.
1.37
1.43
1.47
1.17

D.
Quantity
person-days)
2,762
4,984
7,842
9,405
15,413

See Noshomu sho (ed.), Menshi boseki shokko jijo [Conditions of Factory Workers in
Cotton Spinning] 99 (Tokyo: Noshomu sho, 1903).

Table 8 cont.:

1920
1922
1924
1926
1928

1.31
1.30
1.29
1.30
1.35

8.95
9.49
10.26
10.70
11.76

2.74
2.38
2.38
2.38
2.83

34,103
41,885
35,627
45,118
38,720

1930
1932
1934
1936

1.16
.85
.77
.73

13.97
11.16
9.62
8.76

2.56
2.79
2.43
2.01

33,710
33,197
38,830
40,158

Notes:
(A) Mean daily wage in yen for female workers in cotton spinning sector,
current prices.
(B) Mean hourly wage in sen (¥l/100) for female workers in cotton
spinning sector, constant 1934-36 prices.
(C) Mean annual wage for female workers in cotton spinning sector,
divided by mean annual wage for female workers in agricultural industry.
(D) 1000 person-days worked by female laborers in spinning sector.
Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from Shozaburo Fujino, Shino
Fujino & Akira 0no, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [Long-Term Economic
Statistics: The Textile Industry] 27, 256-77 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha,
1979); Takahiko Hashimoto, Nippon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line
for the Japanese Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] (Tokyo: Bunka shi nempyo
seisaku kenkyu kai, 1935); Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika (ed.),
Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial Statistics] (Tokyo: Noshomu
sho somukyoku tokeika, various years); Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda,
Nobuyuki Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi
Shinoya & Ryoshin Minami, Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic
Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1967); Takejiro
Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko tokei [Reference Statistics Regarding Labor in the
Cotton Industry] 500-03 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1958); Matsuji
Umemura, Saburo Yamada, Yujiro Hayami, Nobuyuki Takamatsu, &
Minoru Kumazaki, Choki keizai tokei: Norin gyo [Long-term Economic
Statistics: Agriculture and Forestry] 220-21 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha,
1966).

B. Cartels as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
1. Introduction. Return, then, to the basic question: if the Boren firms
could not earn monopoly rents, why did they coordinate production cuts?
The answer, I suggest, derives from the principal-agent slack in corporate
governance: absent a cartel, managers would have found it difficult
credibly to commit to keeping the firm’s efficiency wage regime. In turn,
that difficulty derived from four constraints to the contractual structure of
the pre-war cotton spinning firms:
1. The firm’s managers often needed to raise funds from a broad
range of investors.
2. The firm needed to respond to demand shocks primarily by
cutting production rather than wages.
3. Investors could obtain only noisy information (a) about the
wages that their managers paid laborers, and (b) about the
demand curve that the industry faced.
4. Managers hesitated to run the plant at less than full capacity.
Take each of these constraints in turn.
2. Dispersed ownership. Because cotton spinning firms faced significant
economies of scale (Table 9), many could raise the large amounts they
needed only by issuing stock to a wide spectrum of investors. Together,
these firms accounted for a major part of the trades on the Tokyo and the
Osaka stock exchanges.60 Had they been able to attract money from the
large conglomerates (the zaibatsu), perhaps they could have avoided
widely dispersed stock holdings. Whatever the reason, however, those
conglomerates chose not to invest heavily in cotton spinning (Table 10).
The firms thus often had little choice but to build publicly held firms.
3. Demand shock responses. For reasons explained above (Section
IV.A.5.), spinning firms could minimize their long-term labor costs only if
they responded to demand shocks by cutting production rather than
wages. Because of the monitoring and metering problems in the industry,
they minimized their wage bill by paying efficiency wages; because most
workers came from the farm, they paid efficiency wages only by paying a
steady premium above the agricultural wage; because the demand for
60

See generally Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho (ed.), Okabu 50-nenshi [50-Year History of
the OSE] (Osaka: Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho, 1928); Tokyo kabushiki torihiki sho (ed.)
Tokyo kabushiki torihiki sho [The Tokyo Stock Exchange] (Tokyo: Keizai shimbun sha, 1916).

agricultural and textile labor moved independently, they could not cut
wages without cutting their efficiency wage premium.
4. Noisy information. (a) Wages. Public investors in the spinning firms
had only noisy information about their firm’s wage scales. Had the firm
paid its workers a straight daily wage, a straight seniority based wage, or
a straight piece-rate contract, the investors would have had clean
information. Their managers could have reported the scale they paid, and
they could then have hired an independent auditor to verify the report.
Most cotton spinning firms, however, blended seniority wages with
piece-rate wages.61 A pure fixed or seniority-based contract created
incentive problems: workers had less reason to work hard, and more
reason to shirk. A pure piece-rate contract created metering and quality
problems: (i) cotton spinning involved too much team production to
permit a manager to meter individual output cleanly and readily, and (ii)
piece-rate contracts induced workers to lower the quality of the output
they produced. To mitigate these problems, most cotton-spinning firms
blended the two contractual forms: they paid a worker by her team’s
output, but on an individualized per-unit scale that depended on how the
manager generally appraised the pace and quality of her work. As a
result, a manager rated each worker’s skill and diligence. He gauged the
quality and quantity of each worker’s output, and adjusted it from time to
time as warranted. In turn, she could increase her pay both by inducing
her team to increase its production (thereby increasing her own units of
output), and by impressing her supervisor (thereby increasing her perunit wage).
Investors received only noisy information about all this for two
reasons: the factory hired new workers regularly, and the investors could
not readily gauge whether a manager promoted his workers on the perunit scale at the optimal pace. To create the right incentives for their
workers, the investors had to delegate discretion to their manager; in the
process, however, they necessarily left themselves vulnerable. If a
manager wanted to cheat on the firm’s efficiency wages, he could promote
his workers too slowly; if he wanted to waste firm resources, he could
promote them too generously. Should he promote workers either too
quickly or too slowly, investors would learn that fact only much later, if
they learned it all. Eventually, they might discover that they were paying
61

Riyuemon Uno, Shokko chingin shiharai no shin hoho [A New Means of Paying Factory
Workers] (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1913); Hosei, supra note 46, at 160-89. Tsurumi, supra
note 49, at 148, claims that firms generally used pure piece-rate contracts for women, but
this claim is belied by her own account of the many discretionary adjustments made.

higher wages than they needed to pay, or that they were incurring higher
monitoring costs because their spartan wages had raised employee
shirking. Alternatively, though, they might never know. Firms fail for a
myriad of reasons, and many investors never learn why; ex post, investors
often have trouble disentangling why a firm did so poorly. The managers
responsible may have long since left anyway.
(b) Demand curve. If investors lacked clean information about their own
wage scales, they also lacked clean information about the industry’s
demand curve. They knew their own firm’s sales, granted. Yet with only
that information they could not distinguish between (i) a fall in industrywide demand and (ii) a fall in demand specific to their firm. These two
problems, however, dictated radically different responses: the former
dictated production cuts, while the latter required a product change to
meet consumer tastes. Absent industry-wide information, investors could
not distinguish the two.62
5. Managerial reluctance to cut production. Even where investors would
have wanted their manager to cut production, a manager sometimes had
an incentive not to do so. To see why, suppose first that he had short-term
horizons. Many probably did, for the shortage in well-trained managers
enabled people who wanted to switch jobs to switch easily. For them, prewar Japan was not the Japan of “lifetime employment.” Suppose too that a
manager discovered that industry-wide demand had fallen. If he either
operated the plant at a loss or idled part of it, investors would notice. If he
kept the plant at full capacity and kept it in the black by cutting wages,
investors would not notice—at least for some time. To cut the short-term
wage bill, he needed only to slow the rate at which he promoted his
workers. In the long run, by lowering the efficiency wage premium the
firm paid, he would increase shirking and raise the firm’s wage bill. In the
short run, he could avoid an investigation of his managerial activities—
and the short run can often last a long time.
This problem stemmed from the noisy information and collective
action problems the firm’s investors faced. Assume—counter-factually—
that a single investor with perfect information owned each cotton
spinning firm. If industry-wide demand fell, the investor could order his
manager to cut capacity. If the manager instead cut wages, he could fire
62

Price information on yarns would not yield this information because of the broad
fluctuations in prices during these years. See Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, Nobuyuki
Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi Shinoya & Ryoshin Minami,
Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai
shimpo sha, 1967).

him. Now assume—more realistically—that investors had noisy and
incomplete information, and that each owned only a small share of the
firm. Two problems ensued. First, because of their coarse information sets,
investors could not distinguish industry-wide slumps from firm-specific
declines. Second, because of their collective-action problems, they had
little incentive to intervene in their firm unless they received strong
signals that their managers might have misbehaved.63
To protect his tenure at a firm, a manager had somehow to insure that
investors received no strong signals that he may have mismanaged it.
Should he either run the plant in the red or idle part of it, he sent just such
a signal. Investors would sometimes then have found it cost-effective to
intervene and investigate. If he had idled the plant, he could have done so
either (a) because of an industry-wide slump, or (b) because of his own
poor performance. If the investors could obtain perfect information, he
would not worry. The investors would have absolved him and left. If
investors could obtain only noisy and incomplete information, however,
then even an honest and able manager faced a nontrivial risk of discharge
or demotion. In such a world, he often did better if he could send no
strong signals that investors might interpret unfavorably.
6. The solution. Firms in the Japanese cotton spinning industry solved
these problems through the Boren. They did so in two steps. First, they
pooled information about industry-wide demand. By contributing
information about their own firm s, they together generated the data that
let them gauge the extent they suffered from industry-wide demand
shocks. They could then have forwarded that information to their
investors, and—if their investors faced no collective-action problems—
those investors could have determined whether the firm should cut
capacity. Absent collective-action problems, the firms needed the Boren
for information pooling, and for nothing more.
Yet the investors in many cotton spinning firms did face collective
action problems, and it was to mitigate those problems that the Boren not
only pooled information but also ordered capacity cuts. If privately held
firms could trust their owner to decide whether to cut production,
publicly traded firms could replicate that result by delegating the decision
to a third party, the Boren. In giving Boren officers that authority,
managers committed themselves to enforcing their firm’s efficiency wage
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True, because the stock was listed on the national exchanges, they could easily sell
their interests even if they received only weak signals that their managers had
misbehaved. Given that their sale price would have incorporated those signals, though,
they would have found the sale small consolation.

strategy, and investors reduced the cost of verifying that their manager
had acted appropriately. In effect, managers and owners assigned the
Boren the task not just of pooling information, but of interpreting it and
enforcing that interpretation as well. In a world without antitrust, no one
incurred legal risks in fixing quantity; in an internationally competitive
industry with many spinners from many countries, neither did anyone
incur many technological risks by sharing information.
The Boren membership patterns loosely corroborate this hypothesis.
During the early decades of the century, not all cotton-spinning firms
joined the Boren. Of those that listed their shares on either the Tokyo or
Osaka stock exchange, though, nearly all did. All such firms faced the
principal-agent and collective-action problems described above, and most
mitigated them through the Boren. Only privately held firms faced less of
a problem, and primarily only they avoided the Boren.64
That managers needed to tie their hands also explains some of the
more bizarre aspects of the agreements. Recall the details: the Boren often
required firms to idle specified percentages of their capacity, but never
banned them from augmenting that capacity (Table 2). If Boren members
hoped to raise prices, this made no sense. Without a way to limit new
capacity, they could not have cut production and could not have raised
prices.
In contrast, suppose that the Boren firms negotiated their agreement to
mitigate the agency slack between investors and their managers. More
specifically, suppose that they wanted to induce managers to idle
machines whenever the investors would have wanted them idled. The
Boren agreements addressed the problem precisely. The firms did not use
the Boren to ban investments in new capacity because most of the firms
had already assigned that decision to the investors directly. They did so
64

Of the 11 non-Boren cotton spinning firms listed in Zaisei, supra note 23, at 210,
none had listed stock. Although Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, 58, lists two muslin firms
outside the Boren and both had publicly traded stock, Shigeru Kano (ed.), Tokyo kabushiki
torihiki jo [Tokyo Stock Exchange] 125 (Tokyo: Hideshi Kano, 1933), lists these firms as not
being cotton spinning firms. It is difficult to differentiate cotton spinning firms on the
basis of name alone. If we eliminate firms that seem to have specialized in flax and wool,
however, as of 1925 the only non-Boren cotton spinning firm on either the Tokyo Stock
Exchange or the Osaka Stock Exchange was one Naniwa boshoku. On Boren
membership, see Dai-Nippon supra note 18; on the stock listings, see Osaka, supra note 60;
Tokyo, supra note 60; Kano, supra note 64.

by regularly draining the firm of cash.65 Through high dividend policies,
they insured that they often could build new plants only by raising new
capital. In the process, the managers credibly commited themselves to the
discipline of the capital market on questions of new investment 66

Table 9: Scale Economies in Cotton Spinning
A. Relative Costs:
Spindles/
Wages Amenities Operating
Factory Materials (labor)
(labor)
Costs Total
5,000
21.77
104.14
16.92
22.37
165.20
10,000
21.77
73.59
11.95
19.34 126.65
20,000
21.77
57.66
9.35
18.84 107.64
30,000
21.77
51.53
8.37
18.33 100.00
40,000
21.77
49.25
8.00
18.09
97.11
50,000
21.77
47.97
7.79
17.93
95.46
60,000
21.77
47.14
7.66
17.83
94.40
B. Firm Size:
Number of
Spindles
Under 10,000
10,000- 49,999
50,000- 99,999
100,000-299,999
300,000-499,999
500,000 and over

No. of
Firms
10
25
14
20
3
8

(%)
(12.5)
(31.3)
(17.5)
(25.0)
(3.7)
(10.0)

Total
Spindles
51,268
614,820
932,828
3,040,996
1,050,604
6,668,248

(%)
(0.4)
(5.0)
(7.5)
(24.6)
(8.5)
(54.0)

Note: In A, costs are indexed by expenses for 30,000-spindle factories, and
are for No. 20 yarn. In B, firm size is as of 1937.
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For evidence of high dividend rates in the spinning industry, see Dai-Nippon
boseki rengo kai, Menshi boseki jijo sanko sho [Reference Regarding Cotton Yarn Spinning
Matters] (0saka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years).
66 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am. Econ.
Rev. 650 (1984).
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Source: Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton
Industry] 204, 473 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954).

Table 10: Zaibatsu Investments in
Cotton Spinning
A. Zaibatsu Holdings in Spinning Firms
The Mitsui Zaibatsu
Mitsui
Firm
Mitsui share
Textile firm
shareholdings spindles of spindles
Kanebo
6.71%
615,192
41,279
Kinka boseki
41.36
144,624
59,816
Toyoda boshoku
5.97
79,824
4,765
Tenma boshoku
48.58
65,792
31,962
Utsumi boshoku
48.97
72,500
35,503
Tokyo mosurin
48.52
79,128
38,393
Kikui boshoku
1.43
62,428
768
The Mitsubishi Zaibatsu
Mitsubishi s/g
Mitsubishi share
Nagasaki boshoku
2.79
98,656
2,753
Fuji gasu boseki
1.43
502,104
7,180
The Sumitomo Zaibatsu
Sumitomo s/g
Sumitomo share
0saka godo boseki
0.67
427,524
2,864
The Yasuda Zaibatsu
Yasuda s/g
Yasuda share
0saka godo boseki
0.86
427,524
3,677

Table 10 cont.:

B. Zaibatsu Share of Total Industry Spindles (6,529,394)

Mitsui
Mitsubishi
Sumitomo
Yasuda
TOTAL

Spindles
212,486
9,933
2,864
3,677

Percent
3.25
0.15
0.04
0.06

228,960

3.50

Notes: Figures are from Takahashi (cited below) where available, and
from stockholder lists in company semi-annual reports where not. Mitsui
ownership in Kinka and Tokyo mosurin are Takahashi’s estimates. Stock
classes are combined on an equal basis. Figures are as of approximately
1928.
Sources: Kamekichi Takahashi, Nippon zaibatsu no kaibo [An Analysis of the
Japanese Zaibatsu] (Tokyo: Chuo koron sha, 1930); semi-annual company
reports for Kikui boshoku, Tenma boshoku, and 0saka bodo.

V. Conclusion
Just once, you should come see a farming or fishing village.
You won't find a single girl. All you’ll see are shivelled old
grannies. The girls are all gone, left the village for work. ... We
guys are left, but we’re lonely. Real lonely. Even suppose I can
take the loneliness. How am I going to find a wife? I want a wife
so bad I’m going crazy. But no girl’ll marry a poor farmer
anymore. Even when they come back to the village from the
factories, they’ve turned completely high-class. With their hair
done up and perfumed and all, they won’t even look at us.
It was a letter to the editor of a Tokyo daily newspaper.67 And it
captured at least some of the economic impact of the textile industry.
Having made a minor fortune in the mills, the women had raised their
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Quoted in Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 121. Of course, there may have other
reasons factory women would not give this man the time of day—there usually are. Of
the 1,536 women in spinning factories surveyed in 1927, 801 said they hoped to marry a
farmer. See Chuo, supra note 44, at 22-23.

sights. It is not what one reads in the tirades against the mills so popular
in the fashionable histories. But the fashionable histories miss the
industry’s effect on female incomes. “It was harder work at first than I had
done before,” recalled one old woman. As a young girl, she had left her
hometown for a silk reeling factory. “But since there were lots of us and
we all worked together, it was kind of fun. And besides, it paid better.”68
Peasants may be poor, Donald McCloskey reminds us, but they are not
fools. They respond to market incentives, and they respond rationally. To
induce them to work in the new spinning factories, the owners had to
make it worth their while; to induce them to work hard in the new mills,
they had to make it lucrative. The firms did so by paying peasant women
double or triple their market-clearing wage. Largely, their scheme
worked. Rather than lose such a well-paying job, the young women
worked hard.
Within the firm, that which promoted the welfare of its managers did
not always promote the welfare of its investors. In particular, given the
noisy information and the diversified ownership patterns in the industry,
managers sometimes had an incentive to respond to demand shocks
suboptimally—to cheat on the firm’s high wage strategy rather than to cut
plant capacity. To commit credibly to cutting capacity rather than wages,
the managers placed the firm in the Boren. In the process, they tied their
hands—they assigned the decision about wage and production cuts to a
third party.
Although the Boren adopted the appearance of a cartel, it
accomplished something radically diferent. Although the spinning firms
used it to coordinate production cutbacks, they did not use it to earn
monopoly rents. Instead, they used it to lower operating costs. Whether of
Japan or elsewhere, scholars too readily conclude that if it looks like a
monopoly rent and quacks like a monopoly rent, it must be a monopoly
rent. Like ducks, like rents: the Japanese spinning firms illustrate again
how wrong that approach can be.

68

Quoted in Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 336.

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and
Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July 1991).
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991).
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September
1991).
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract
(February 1992).
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common
Pools (February 1992).
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of
AIDS (April 1992).
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992).
William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic
Analysis (July 1992).
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of
Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study (August 1992).
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A
Theoretical Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September
1992).
Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts
(November, 1992).
Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January,
1993).
J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Commiting to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan (March, 1993).

